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제로 데이 취약점을 악용하는 APT41 잡기

Apr 2020

This blog looks at how the cyber-criminal group APT41 exploited a zero-day vulnerability, and examines how Darktrace’s AI detected and investigated the threat at machine speed.

Executive summary

Darktrace detected several highly targeted attacks in early March, well before any associated signatures had become available. Two weeks later, the attacks were attributed to Chinese threat-actor APT41.
APT41 exploited the Zoho ManageEngine zero-day vulnerability CVE-2020-10189. Darktrace automatically detected and reported on the attack in its earliest stages, enabling customers to contain the threat before it could make an impact.
The intrusions described here were part of a wider campaign aiming to gain initial access to as many companies as possible during the window of opportunity presented by CVE-2020-10189.
The reports generated by Darktrace highlighted and delineated every aspect of the incident in the form of a meaningful security narrative. Even a junior responder could have reviewed this output and acted on this zero-day APT attack in under 5 minutes.

Fighting APT41’s global attack

In early March, Darktrace detected several advanced attacks targeting customers in the US and Europe. A majority of these customers are in the legal sector. The attacks shared the same Techniques, Tools & Procedures (TTPs), targeting public-facing servers and exploiting recent high-impact vulnerabilities. Last week, FireEye attributed this suspicious activity to the Chinese cyber espionage group APT41.

This campaign used the Zoho ManageEngine zero-day vulnerability CVE-2020-10189 to get access to various companies, but little to no follow-up was detected after initial intrusion. This activity indicates a broad-brush campaign to get initial access to as many target companies as possible during the zero-day window of opportunity.

The malicious activity observed by Darktrace took place late on Sunday March 8, 2020 and in the morning of March 9, 2020 (UTC), broadly in line with office hours previously attributed to the Chinese cyber espionage group APT41.

The graphic below shows an exemplary timeline from one of the customers targeted by APT41. The attacks observed in other customer environments are identical.

Timeline of the APT41 attack — *Figure 1: A timeline of the attack*

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Technical analysis

The attack described here centered around the Zoho ManageEngine zero-day vulnerability CVE-2020-10189. Most of the attack appears to have been automated.

We observed the initial intrusion, several follow-up payload downloads, and command and control (C2) traffic. In all cases, the activity was contained before any later steps in the attack lifecycle, such as lateral movement or data exfiltration, were identified.

The below screenshot shows an overview of the key AI Analyst detections reported. Not only did it report on the SSL and HTTP C2 traffic, but it also reported on the payload downloads:

Cyber AI Analyst breaks down the APT41 attack — *Figure 2: SSL C2 detection by Cyber AI Analyst*

*Figure 3: Payload detection by Cyber AI Analyst*

Initial compromise

The initial compromise began with the successful exploitation of the Zoho ManageEngine zero-day vulnerability CVE-2020-10189. Following the initial intrusion, the Microsoft BITSAdmin command line tool was used to fetch and install a malicious Batch file, described below:

install.bat (MD5: 7966c2c546b71e800397a67f942858d0) from infrastructure 66.42.98[.]220 on port 12345.

Source: 10.60.50.XX
Destination: 66.42.98[.]220
Destination Port: 12345
Content Type: application/x-msdownload
Protocol: HTTP
Host: 66.42.98[.]220
URI: /test/install.bat
Method: GET
Status Code: 200

Figure 4: Outbound connection fetching batch file

Shortly after the initial compromise, the first stage Cobalt Strike Beacon LOADER was downloaded.

Cobalt Strike Beacon loader screenshot — *Figure 5: Detection of the Cobalt Strike Beacon LOADER*

Command and Control traffic

Storesyncsvc.dll was a Cobalt Strike Beacon implant (trial-version) which connected to exchange.dumb1[.]com. A successful DNS resolution to 74.82.201[.]8 was identified, which Darktrace discerned as a successful SSL connection to a hostname with Dynamic DNS properties.

Multiple connections to exchange.dumb1[.]com were identified as beaconing to a C2 center. This C2 traffic to the initial Cobalt Strike Beacon was leveraged to download a second stage payload.

Interestingly, TeamViewer activity and the download of Notepad++ was taking place at the same time as the C2 traffic was starting in some of the customer attacks. This indicates APT41 trying to use familiar tools instead of completely ‘Living off the Land’. There is at least high certainty that the use of these two tools can be attributed to this intrusion instead of regular business activity. Notepad++ was not normally used in the target customers’ environments, nor was TeamViewer – in fact, the use of both applications was 100% unusual for the targeted organizations.

Attack tools download

CertUtil.exe, a command line program installed as part of Certificate Services, was then leveraged to connect externally and download the second stage payload.

Detection associated with Meterpreter activity

Figure 6: Darktrace detecting the usage of CertUtil

A few hours after this executable download, the infected device made an outbound HTTP connection requesting the URI /TzGG, which was identified as Meterpreter downloading further shellcode for the Cobalt Strike Beacon.

*Figure 7: Detection associated with Meterpreter activity. No lateral movement or significant data exfiltration was observed.*

How Cyber AI Analyst reported on the zero-day exploit

Darktrace not only detected this zero-day attack campaign, but Cyber AI Analyst also saved security teams valuable time by investigating disparate security events and generating a report that immediately put them in a position to take action.

The below screenshot shows the AI Analyst incidents reported in one infected environment, over the eight days covering the intrusion period. The first incident on the left represents the APT activity described here. The other five incidents are independent of the APT activity and not as severe.

AI Analyst Security Incidents — *Figure 8: The security incidents surfaced by AI Analyst*

AI Analyst reported on six incidents in total over the eight-day period. Each AI Analyst incident includes a detailed timeline and summary of the incident, in a concise format that takes an average of two minutes to review. This means that with Cyber AI Analyst, even a non-technical person could have actioned a response to this sophisticated, zero-day incident in less than five minutes.

Conclusion

Without public Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) or any open-source intelligence available, targeted attacks are incredibly difficult to detect. Moreover, even the best detections are useless if they cannot be actioned by a security analyst at an early stage. Too often this occurs because of an overwhelming volume of alerts, or simply because the skills barrier to triage and investigation is too high.

This appears to be a broad campaign to gain initial access to many different companies and sectors. While very sophisticated in nature, the threat sacrificed stealth for speed by targeting many companies at the same time. APT41 wanted to utilize the limited window of opportunity that the Zoho zero-day provided before IT staff starts patching.

Darktrace’s Cyber AI is specifically designed to detect the subtle signs of targeted, unknown attacks at an early stage, without relying on prior knowledge or IoCs. It achieves this by continuously learning the normal patterns of behavior for every user, device, and associated peer group from scratch, and ‘on the job’.

In the face of this zero-day attack campaign, the AI’s ability to (a) detect unknown threats with self-learning AI and (b) augment strained responders with AI-driven investigations and reporting proved crucial. Indeed, it ensured that the attacks were swiftly contained before escalating to the later stages of the attack lifecycle.

Indicators of Compromise

Selection of Darktrace model breaches:

Anomalous File / Script from Rare External
Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location
Compromise / SSL to DynDNS
Compliance / CertUtil External Connection
Anomalous Connection / CertUtil Requesting Non Certificate
Anomalous Connection / CertUtil to Rare Destination
Anomalous Connection / New User-Agent to IP Without Hostname
Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise
Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare
Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare
Anomalous File / Numeric Exe Download
Device / Large Number of Model Breaches
Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server
Compromise / Sustained TCP Beaconing Activity To Rare Endpoint
Compliance / Remote Management Tool On Server

The below screenshot shows Darktrace model breaches occurring together during the compromise of one customer:

*Figure 9: Darktrace model breaches occurring together*

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INSIDE THE SOC

Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.

AUTHOR

ABOUT ThE AUTHOR

맥스 하이네마이어

최고 제품 책임자(CPO)

Max is a cyber security expert with over a decade of experience in the field, specializing in a wide range of areas such as Penetration Testing, Red-Teaming, SIEM and SOC consulting and hunting Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups. At Darktrace, Max is closely involved with Darktrace’s strategic customers & prospects. He works with the R&D team at Darktrace, shaping research into new AI innovations and their various defensive and offensive applications. Max’s insights are regularly featured in international media outlets such as the BBC, Forbes and WIRED. Max holds an MSc from the University of Duisburg-Essen and a BSc from the Cooperative State University Stuttgart in International Business Information Systems.

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A Thorn in Attackers’ Sides: How Darktrace Uncovered a CACTUS Ransomware Infection

Apr 2024

What is CACTUS Ransomware?

In May 2023, Kroll Cyber Threat Intelligence Analysts identified CACTUS as a new ransomware strain that had been actively targeting large commercial organizations since March 2023 [1]. CACTUS ransomware gets its name from the filename of the ransom note, “cAcTuS.readme.txt”. Encrypted files are appended with the extension “.cts”, followed by a number which varies between attacks, e.g. “.cts1” and “.cts2”.

As the cyber threat landscape adapts to ever-present fast-paced technological change, ransomware affiliates are employing progressively sophisticated techniques to enter networks, evade detection and achieve their nefarious goals.

How does CACTUS Ransomware work?

In the case of CACTUS, threat actors have been seen gaining initial network access by exploiting Virtual Private Network (VPN) services. Once inside the network, they may conduct internal scanning using tools like SoftPerfect Network Scanner, and PowerShell commands to enumerate endpoints, identify user accounts, and ping remote endpoints. Persistence is maintained by the deployment of various remote access methods, including legitimate remote access tools like Splashtop, AnyDesk, and SuperOps RMM in order to evade detection, along with malicious tools like Cobalt Strike and Chisel. Such tools, as well as custom scripts like TotalExec, have been used to disable security software to distribute the ransomware binary. CACTUS ransomware is unique in that it adopts a double-extortion tactic, stealing data from target networks and then encrypting it on compromised systems [2].

At the end of November 2023, cybersecurity firm Arctic Wolf reported instances of CACTUS attacks exploiting vulnerabilities on the Windows version of the business analytics platform Qlik, specifically CVE-2023-41266, CVE-2023-41265, and CVE-2023-48365, to gain initial access to target networks [3]. The vulnerability tracked as CVE-2023-41266 can be exploited to generate anonymous sessions and perform HTTP requests to unauthorized endpoints, whilst CVE-2023-41265 does not require authentication and can be leveraged to elevate privileges and execute HTTP requests on the backend server that hosts the application [2].

Darktrace’s Coverage of CACTUS Ransomware

In November 2023, Darktrace observed malicious actors leveraging the aforementioned method of exploiting Qlik to gain access to the network of a customer in the US, more than a week before the vulnerability was reported by external researchers.

Here, Qlik vulnerabilities were successfully exploited, and a malicious executable (.exe) was detonated on the network, which was followed by network scanning and failed Kerberos login attempts. The attack culminated in the encryption of numerous files with extensions such as “.cts1”, and SMB writes of the ransom note “cAcTuS.readme.txt” to multiple internal devices, all of which was promptly identified by Darktrace DETECT™.

While traditional rules and signature-based detection tools may struggle to identify the malicious use of a legitimate business platform like Qlik, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI was able to confidently identify anomalous use of the tool in a CACTUS ransomware attack by examining the rarity of the offending device’s surrounding activity and comparing it to the learned behavior of the device and its peers.

Unfortunately for the customer in this case, Darktrace RESPOND™ was not enabled in autonomous response mode during their encounter with CACTUS ransomware meaning that attackers were able to successfully escalate their attack to the point of ransomware detonation and file encryption. Had RESPOND been configured to autonomously act on any unusual activity, Darktrace could have prevented the attack from progressing, stopping the download of any harmful files, or the encryption of legitimate ones.

Cactus Ransomware Attack Overview

Holiday periods have increasingly become one of the favoured times for malicious actors to launch their attacks, as they can take advantage of the festive downtime of organizations and their security teams, and the typically more relaxed mindset of employees during this period [4].

Following this trend, in late November 2023, Darktrace began detecting anomalous connections on the network of a customer in the US, which presented multiple indicators of compromise (IoCs) and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) associated with CACTUS ransomware. The threat actors in this case set their attack in motion by exploiting the Qlik vulnerabilities on one of the customer’s critical servers.

Darktrace observed the server device making beaconing connections to the endpoint “zohoservice[.]net” (IP address: 45.61.147.176) over the course of three days. This endpoint is known to host a malicious payload, namely a .zip file containing the command line connection tool PuttyLink [5].

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was able to autonomously identify over 1,000 beaconing connections taking place on the customer’s network and group them together, in this case joining the dots in an ongoing ransomware attack. AI Analyst recognized that these repeated connections to highly suspicious locations were indicative of malicious command-and-control (C2) activity.

Figure 1: Cyber AI Analyst Incident Log showing the offending device making over 1,000 connections to the suspicious hostname “zohoservice[.]net” over port 8383, within a specific period.

The infected device was then observed downloading the file “putty.zip” over a HTTP connection using a PowerShell user agent. Despite being labelled as a .zip file, Darktrace’s detection capabilities were able to identify this as a masqueraded PuttyLink executable file. This activity resulted in multiple Darktrace DETECT models being triggered. These models are designed to look for suspicious file downloads from endpoints not usually visited by devices on the network, and files whose types are masqueraded, as well as the anomalous use of PowerShell. This behavior resembled previously observed activity with regards to the exploitation of Qlik Sense as an intrusion technique prior to the deployment of CACTUS ransomware [5].

Figure 2: The downloaded file’s URI highlighting that the file type (.exe) does not match the file's extension (.zip). Information about the observed PowerShell user agent is also featured.

Following the download of the masqueraded file, Darktrace observed the initial infected device engaging in unusual network scanning activity over the SMB, RDP and LDAP protocols. During this activity, the credential, “service_qlik” was observed, further indicating that Qlik was exploited by threat actors attempting to evade detection. Connections to other internal devices were made as part of this scanning activity as the attackers attempted to move laterally across the network.

Figure 3: Numerous failed connections from the affected server to multiple other internal devices over port 445, indicating SMB scanning activity.

The compromised server was then seen initiating multiple sessions over the RDP protocol to another device on the customer’s network, namely an internal DNS server. External researchers had previously observed this technique in CACTUS ransomware attacks where an RDP tunnel was established via Plink [5].

A few days later, on November 24, Darktrace identified over 20,000 failed Kerberos authentication attempts for the username “service_qlik” being made to the internal DNS server, clearly representing a brute-force login attack. There is currently a lack of open-source intelligence (OSINT) material definitively listing Kerberos login failures as part of a CACTUS ransomware attack that exploits the Qlik vulnerabilities. This highlights Darktrace’s ability to identify ongoing threats amongst unusual network activity without relying on existing threat intelligence, emphasizing its advantage over traditional security detection tools.

Figure 4: Kerberos login failures being carried out by the initial infected device. The destination device detected was an internal DNS server.

In the month following these failed Kerberos login attempts, between November 26 and December 22, Darktrace observed multiple internal devices encrypting files within the customer’s environment with the extensions “.cts1” and “.cts7”. Devices were also seen writing ransom notes with the file name “cAcTuS.readme.txt” to two additional internal devices, as well as files likely associated with Qlik, such as “QlikSense.pdf”. This activity detected by Darktrace confirmed the presence of a CACTUS ransomware infection that was spreading across the customer’s network.

Figure 5: The model, 'Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB', triggered in response to SMB file writes of the ransom note, ‘cAcTuS.readme.txt’, that was observed on the customer’s network.

Figure 6: CACTUS ransomware extensions, “.cts1” and “.cts7”, being appended to files on the customer’s network.

Following this initial encryption activity, two affected devices were observed attempting to remove evidence of this activity by deleting the encrypted files.

Figure 7: Attackers attempting to remove evidence of their activity by deleting files with appendage “.cts1”.

Conclusion

In the face of this CACTUS ransomware attack, Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach to threat detection enabled it to quickly identify multiple stages of the cyber kill chain occurring in the customer’s environment. These stages ranged from ‘initial access’ by exploiting Qlik vulnerabilities, which Darktrace was able to detect before the method had been reported by external researchers, to ‘actions on objectives’ by encrypting files. Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI was also able to detect a previously unreported stage of the attack: multiple Kerberos brute force login attempts.

If Darktrace’s autonomous response capability, RESPOND, had been active and enabled in autonomous response mode at the time of this attack, it would have been able to take swift mitigative action to shut down such suspicious activity as soon as it was identified by DETECT, effectively containing the ransomware attack at the earliest possible stage.

Learning a network’s ‘normal’ to identify deviations from established patterns of behaviour enables Darktrace’s identify a potential compromise, even one that uses common and often legitimately used administrative tools. This allows Darktrace to stay one step ahead of the increasingly sophisticated TTPs used by ransomware actors.

Credit to Tiana Kelly, Cyber Analyst & Analyst Team Lead, Anna Gilbertson, Cyber Analyst

Appendices

References

[1] https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cyber/cactus-ransomware-prickly-new-variant-evades-detection

[2] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cactus-ransomware-exploiting-qlik-sense-flaws-to-breach-networks/

[3] https://explore.avertium.com/resource/new-ransomware-strains-cactus-and-3am

[4] https://www.soitron.com/cyber-attackers-abuse-holidays/

[5] https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/qlik-sense-exploited-in-cactus-ransomware-campaign/

Darktrace DETECT Models

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)

Anomalous Connection / PowerShell to Rare External

Device / New PowerShell User Agent

Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Internal Remote Desktop

User / Kerberos Password Brute Force

Compromise / Ransomware / Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB

Unusual Activity / Anomalous SMB Delete Volume

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port

Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare

Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination

Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server

Compliance / Remote Management Tool On Server

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)

Compromise / Suspicious File and C2

Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert

Device / Large Number of Model Breaches

Anomalous File / Masqueraded File Transfer

Anomalous File / Internet facing System File Download

Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server

Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Medium Period)

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)

List of IoCs

IoC - Type - Description‍

zohoservice[.]net: 45.61.147[.]176 - Domain name: IP Address - Hosting payload over HTTP

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT; Windows NT 10.0; en-US) WindowsPowerShell/5.1.17763.2183 - User agent -PowerShell user agent

.cts1 - File extension - Malicious appendage

.cts7- File extension - Malicious appendage

cAcTuS.readme.txt - Filename -Ransom note

putty.zip – Filename - Initial payload: ZIP containing PuTTY Link

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic - Technique - SubTechnique

Web Protocols: COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071 -T1071.001

Powershell: EXECUTION - T1059 - T1059.001

Exploitation of Remote Services: LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1210 – N/A

Vulnerability Scanning: RECONAISSANCE - T1595 - T1595.002

Network Service Scanning: DISCOVERY - T1046 - N/A

Malware: RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT - T1588 - T1588.001

Drive-by Compromise: INITIAL ACCESS - T1189 - N/A

Remote Desktop Protocol: LATERAL MOVEMENT – 1021 -T1021.001

Brute Force: CREDENTIAL ACCESS T – 1110 - N/A

Data Encrypted for Impact: IMPACT - T1486 - N/A

Data Destruction: IMPACT - T1485 - N/A

File Deletion: DEFENSE EVASION - T1070 - T1070.004

About the author

Tiana Kelly

Deputy Team Lead, London & Cyber Analyst

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The State of AI in Cybersecurity: How AI will impact the cyber threat landscape in 2024

Apr 2024

About the AI Cybersecurity Report

We surveyed 1,800 CISOs, security leaders, administrators, and practitioners from industries around the globe. Our research was conducted to understand how the adoption of new AI-powered offensive and defensive cybersecurity technologies are being managed by organizations.

This blog is continuing the conversation from our last blog post “The State of AI in Cybersecurity: Unveiling Global Insights from 1,800 Security Practitioners” which was an overview of the entire report. This blog will focus on one aspect of the overarching report, the impact of AI on the cyber threat landscape.

To access the full report click here.

Are organizations feeling the impact of AI-powered cyber threats?

Nearly three-quarters (74%) state AI-powered threats are now a significant issue. Almost nine in ten (89%) agree that AI-powered threats will remain a major challenge into the foreseeable future, not just for the next one to two years.

However, only a slight majority (56%) thought AI-powered threats were a separate issue from traditional/non AI-powered threats. This could be the case because there are few, if any, reliable methods to determine whether an attack is AI-powered.

Identifying exactly when and where AI is being applied may not ever be possible. However, it is possible for AI to affect every stage of the attack lifecycle. As such, defenders will likely need to focus on preparing for a world where threats are unique and are coming faster than ever before.

a hypothetical cyber attack augmented by AI at every stage

Are security stakeholders concerned about AI’s impact on cyber threats and risks?

The results from our survey showed that security practitioners are concerned that AI will impact organizations in a variety of ways. There was equal concern associated across the board – from volume and sophistication of malware to internal risks like leakage of proprietary information from employees using generative AI tools.

What this tells us is that defenders need to prepare for a greater volume of sophisticated attacks and balance this with a focus on cyber hygiene to manage internal risks.

One example of a growing internal risks is shadow AI. It takes little effort for employees to adopt publicly-available text-based generative AI systems to increase their productivity. This opens the door to “shadow AI”, which is the use of popular AI tools without organizational approval or oversight. Resulting security risks such as inadvertent exposure of sensitive information or intellectual property are an ever-growing concern.

Are organizations taking strides to reduce risks associated with adoption of AI in their application and computing environment?

71.2% of survey participants say their organization has taken steps specifically to reduce the risk of using AI within its application and computing environment.

16.3% of survey participants claim their organization has not taken these steps.

These findings are good news. Even as enterprises compete to get as much value from AI as they can, as quickly as possible, they’re tempering their eager embrace of new tools with sensible caution.

Still, responses varied across roles. Security analysts, operators, administrators, and incident responders are less likely to have said their organizations had taken AI risk mitigation steps than respondents in other roles. In fact, 79% of executives said steps had been taken, and only 54% of respondents in hands-on roles agreed. It seems that leaders believe their organizations are taking the needed steps, but practitioners are seeing a gap.

Do security professionals feel confident in their preparedness for the next generation of threats?

A majority of respondents (six out of every ten) believe their organizations are inadequately prepared to face the next generation of AI-powered threats.

The survey findings reveal contrasting perceptions of organizational preparedness for cybersecurity threats across different regions and job roles. Security administrators, due to their hands-on experience, express the highest level of skepticism, with 72% feeling their organizations are inadequately prepared. Notably, respondents in mid-sized organizations feel the least prepared, while those in the largest companies feel the most prepared.

Regionally, participants in Asia-Pacific are most likely to believe their organizations are unprepared, while those in Latin America feel the most prepared. This aligns with the observation that Asia-Pacific has been the most impacted region by cybersecurity threats in recent years, according to the IBM X-Force Threat Intelligence Index.

The optimism among Latin American respondents could be attributed to lower threat volumes experienced in the region, but it's cautioned that this could change suddenly (1).

What are biggest barriers to defending against AI-powered threats?

The top-ranked inhibitors center on knowledge and personnel. However, issues are alluded to almost equally across the board including concerns around budget, tool integration, lack of attention to AI-powered threats, and poor cyber hygiene.

The cybersecurity industry is facing a significant shortage of skilled professionals, with a global deficit of approximately 4 million experts (2). As organizations struggle to manage their security tools and alerts, the challenge intensifies with the increasing adoption of AI by attackers. This shift has altered the demands on security teams, requiring practitioners to possess broad and deep knowledge across rapidly evolving solution stacks.

Educating end users about AI-driven defenses becomes paramount as organizations grapple with the shortage of professionals proficient in managing AI-powered security tools. Operationalizing machine learning models for effectiveness and accuracy emerges as a crucial skill set in high demand. However, our survey highlights a concerning lack of understanding among cybersecurity professionals regarding AI-driven threats and the use of AI-driven countermeasures indicating a gap in keeping pace with evolving attacker tactics.

The integration of security solutions remains a notable problem, hindering effective defense strategies. While budget constraints are not a primary inhibitor, organizations must prioritize addressing these challenges to bolster their cybersecurity posture. It's imperative for stakeholders to recognize the importance of investing in skilled professionals and integrated security solutions to mitigate emerging threats effectively.

To access the full report click here.

References

1. IBM, X-Force Threat Intelligence Index 2024, Available at: https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/L0GKXDWJ

2. ISC2, Cybersecurity Workforce Study 2023, Available at: https://media.isc2.org/-/media/Project/ISC2/Main/Media/ documents/research/ISC2_Cybersecurity_Workforce_Study_2023.pdf?rev=28b46de71ce24e6ab7705f6e3da8637e

About the author

Our ai. Your data.

Elevate your cyber defenses with Darktrace AI

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Darktrace AI protecting a business from cyber threats.

Check out this article by Darktrace: Catching APT41 exploiting a zero-day vulnerability

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Threat Finds

제로 데이 취약점을 악용하는 APT41 잡기

Executive summary

Fighting APT41’s global attack

Technical analysis

Initial compromise

Command and Control traffic

Attack tools download

How Cyber AI Analyst reported on the zero-day exploit

Conclusion

Indicators of Compromise

Like this and want more?

More in this series

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Inside the SOC

A Thorn in Attackers’ Sides: How Darktrace Uncovered a CACTUS Ransomware Infection

What is CACTUS Ransomware?

How does CACTUS Ransomware work?

Darktrace’s Coverage of CACTUS Ransomware

Cactus Ransomware Attack Overview

Conclusion

Appendices

References

Darktrace DETECT Models

List of IoCs

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Blog
‍

The State of AI in Cybersecurity: How AI will impact the cyber threat landscape in 2024

About the AI Cybersecurity Report

Are organizations feeling the impact of AI-powered cyber threats?

Are security stakeholders concerned about AI’s impact on cyber threats and risks?

Are organizations taking strides to reduce risks associated with adoption of AI in their application and computing environment?

Do security professionals feel confident in their preparedness for the next generation of threats?

What are biggest barriers to defending against AI-powered threats?

To access the full report click here.

References

Elevate your cyber defenses with Darktrace AI

Additional Products

Blog‍

Threat Finds

제로 데이 취약점을 악용하는 APT41 잡기

Executive summary

Fighting APT41’s global attack

Technical analysis

Initial compromise

Command and Control traffic

Attack tools download

How Cyber AI Analyst reported on the zero-day exploit

Conclusion

Indicators of Compromise

Like this and want more?

Like this and want more?

More in this series

Blog‍

Inside the SOC

A Thorn in Attackers’ Sides: How Darktrace Uncovered a CACTUS Ransomware Infection

What is CACTUS Ransomware?

How does CACTUS Ransomware work?

Darktrace’s Coverage of CACTUS Ransomware

Cactus Ransomware Attack Overview

Conclusion

Appendices

References

Darktrace DETECT Models

List of IoCs

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Blog‍

The State of AI in Cybersecurity: How AI will impact the cyber threat landscape in 2024

About the AI Cybersecurity Report

Are organizations feeling the impact of AI-powered cyber threats?

Are security stakeholders concerned about AI’s impact on cyber threats and risks?

Are organizations taking strides to reduce risks associated with adoption of AI in their application and computing environment?

Do security professionals feel confident in their preparedness for the next generation of threats?

What are biggest barriers to defending against AI-powered threats?

To access the full report click here.

References

Elevate your cyber defenses with Darktrace AI

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